Can You Trust a Doctor You Can\u27t Sue? by Hall, Mark A.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 2 Winter 2005: Symposium - Starting 
Over?: Redesigning the Medical Malpractice 
System 
Article 7 
Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue? 
Mark A. Hall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can't Sue?, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 303 (2005) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol54/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CAN YOU TRUST A DOCTOR YOU CAN'T SUE?
Mark A. Hall*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the consequences of medical malpractice re-
form for patients' trust in their physicians and in the health care deliv-
ery system. I focus on trust because I view this as a core value in
medicine; it is therefore a value that health care law should take ac-
count of, just as family law obviously should consider the special qual-
ities of marital or parental relationships, or banking and securities law
should consider the conditions necessary to maintaining trust in mone-
tary systems and financial markets.
In the medical arena, trust is vitally important for both instrumental
and intrinsic reasons. Doctor-patient relationships are characterized
by levels of intimacy, dependency, and vulnerability that are matched
or exceeded only by family relationships. Without a high level of
trust, patients would not submit to examination, reveal necessary con-
fidences, or undergo invasive or risky treatment. Therefore, trust sets
the stage for, even if it does not resolve, most of the major issues in
health care law.1 Health care law is concerned both with maintaining
the levels of trust necessary for the effective delivery of medical care,
and with punishing and deterring breaches of this trust.
Suits for medical malpractice obviously are central to any inquiry
about the connection between law and medical trust. Threat of liabil-
ity is one of the most effective ways the legal system promotes condi-
tions of trustworthiness-by encouraging physicians to avoid mistakes
that cause injury. Also, the ability to sue is the primary method an
injured patient can seek to assuage the strong sense of betrayal that
can result from egregious medical error, as injured patients sue to
teach the doctor a lesson or make the hospital pay.
These connections with trust could easily be framed in terms of the
classic tort law purposes of deterrence and corrective justice. How-
ever, I prefer initially to use a framework of trust because this helps us
to think of medical malpractice law as part of the fabric of health care
* Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. I am grateful
for the guidance and encouragement provided by my friend and colleague Mike Green.
1. See generally Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2003).
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law, rather than as simply an application of generic tort law principles
to a particular set of specialized services. In saying this, I am re-
minded of a comment Professor John Coffee once made about the law
of class actions, that "[j]ust as war is too important to be left to gener-
als, civil procedure ... is too important to be left to proceduralists. ''2
Likewise, it is important to consider malpractice law as part of a trust-
based law of medical care in order to remind ourselves that these law-
suits arise from a uniquely important relationship with special features
that the law should explicitly take into account.3
General tort law, in my view, does not offer a well-developed set of
analytical tools for thinking about personal injuries arising from
deeply trusting relationships. Classic tort law is mainly concerned
with isolated events between complete strangers or between parties
that have only thin or brief contractual relationships. 4 Therefore,
when personal injury arises from relationships of vulnerability, such as
the doctor-patient relationship, general tort law principles require sig-
nificant adjustment in order to fit the special circumstances. 5
Evidence of this point can be seen in the many special rules that
alter how general tort law applies to family relationships. Spouses
were once immune from tort suits against each other in order to avoid
disturbing family harmony.6 Currently, this is not the law, but, for
similar reasons, parents are still immune in many jurisdictions from
tort suits by their children,7 and courts take into account the special
features of family relationships in limiting the duties that general tort
2. John C. Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Effi-
ciency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987).
3. For more on the relational basis for health law, see Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider,
Where Is the "There" in Health Law? Can It Become a Coherent Field?. 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101
(2004).
4. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001) (documenting the
transition of tort law from isolated applications of the negligence concept to a freestanding body
of law concerned with accidents generally). At one time, workplace injury was the primary
counterexample of an ongoing relationship of vulnerability that occupied a major portion of tort
law, but no-fault workers' compensation moved the employment arena outside of normal tort
law almost a century ago. See generally PRICE FISHBACK & SHAWN KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO
THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION (2000).
5. Consider, for instance, the special tort principles that apply to common carriage and other
forms of "special relationships." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 41 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2004) (on file with author); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 34, 56 (5th ed. 1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 317, 323 (2000).
6. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 1 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 370
(2d ed. 1988); DOBBS, supra note 5, § 279.
7. CLARK, supra note 6, at 375-81; DOBBS, supra note 5, § 280; DONALD T. KRAMER, 1 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 468 (2d ed. 1994).
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theory might otherwise apply to family members.
8 My point is not
that these doctrines should be transplanted directly from family law to
malpractice law. Instead, my point is that when courts apply tort law
to family relationships, they carefully consider the impact on the spe-
cial features of family relationships. The same considerations should
be true for medical malpractice law.
Other health law scholars have focused a great deal of attention on
how well malpractice law creates incentives for improving medical
safety and deterring errors, or indeed whether deterrence is excessive
by taking the form of "defensive medicine."
9 This is a worthwhile fo-
cus, but it misses many of the important connections between mal-
practice law and the doctor-patient relationship. The primary
connection between deterrence and relational concerns is to promote
conditions of trustworthiness, that is, to encourage physicians to live
up to their patients' expectations. Trustworthiness, however, differs
from trust itself. Trustworthiness is a normative judgment about what
level of competence physicians should achieve. The subjective psy-
chological experience of trust itself might not match objective evalua-
tions of trustworthiness. Patients' actual trust might either exceed or
fall below the levels of trust they should have, judged from a norma-
tive perspective. Therefore, I consider how malpractice law might re-
late to actual levels of trust, rather than to background conditions that
may or may not affect trust directly.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL TRUST
In prior work, I outlined two distinct attitudes that law might take
toward trust: proactive and reactive.
10 In its proactive stance, law at-
tempts to increase or sustain trust. 1 In its reactive stance, "law takes
the existence of trust as a factual premise for imposing a particular
rule." 12 As such, "[t]he legal rule does not depend on any assump-
tions about how law affects trust [as a psychological phenomenon],
only that there is trust."1' 3 In contrast, law in its proactive stance seeks
8. DOBBS. supra note 5, § 281. For instance, courts are reluctant to allow former or current
spouses to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress because of the difficulty inherent 
in
defining what constitutes unacceptable behavior between spouses. See generally Ira Mark Ell-
man & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REv. 1268 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1595, 1606-16 (2002).
10. Hall, supra note 1, at 485-86.
11. Id. at 486.
12. Id.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
305
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to produce trust; trust does not produce law.' 4 The proactive stance is
thoroughly empirical and psychological. Its justification depends on
the belief that law actually affects the level of trust.' 5 The reactive
stance, in contrast, is largely normative; law seeks to punish violations
of trust in a fashion that recognizes the levels and types of trust that
patients have in physicians and medical institutions. 16
Under these two broad viewpoints, the first observation about med-
ical malpractice law is that it reacts to trust but does not affect trust.
The ability to sue one's doctor for negligent mistakes is not plausibly
meant to sustain trust or to restore it once it is violated. Instead, mal-
practice suits redress violations of trust. Realistically, patients under-
going treatment and worried about their physician's competence are
not likely to take much solace in knowing they can sue if the doctor
makes a horrible mistake. And, if a medical disaster happens, a suc-
cessful lawsuit is not likely to restore trust. Other aspects of medical
law attempt to keep treatment relationships strong, such as the duty to
treat and to keep patient information confidential.17 But malpractice
law, like divorce law, assumes that when it is invoked, relationships
are irreparably damaged.
In a distant way, malpractice actions might marginally increase the
public's confidence in physicians, in the same way that visible police
enforcement increases a community's sense of safety. More plausibly,
however, such publicity has just the opposite effect, since highlighting
the very worst in the profession casts seeds of doubt about all physi-
cians. Regardless, no one plausibly assumes that conventional mal-
practice law can repair the particular treatment relationships that give
rise to malpractice suits. Hence, malpractice law is not concerned
with restoring trust. Instead, malpractice law reacts to the trust-based
attributes of medical relationships when it crafts the legal conse-
quences of a breach of these relationships.
Compared with traditional tort theory, my perspective resonates
with corrective or retributive justice approaches, which view tort law
as punishing wrongdoers or as assigning responsibility for rectifying
the consequences of wrongful actions.' 8 These theories of tort law
have been developed mainly in the context of accidents between
strangers, but they have even greater relevance to the thick form of
14. Id.
15. Id. at 473.
16. Hall, supra note 1, at 498.
17. Id. at 499; Lois Shepard, HIV, the ADA, and the Duty to Treat, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1055,
1095-98 (2000).
18. See generally JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
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trust created by medical relationships.'
9 The strong sense of betrayal
that can result from the breach of this highly emotive form of inter-
personal trust creates morally laden conditions that are highly rele-
vant to retributive or corrective theories of justice.
20 A corrective
justice perspective might well have a different quality here than in
general tort law because of the unique moral concerns that arise from
breaches of duty within interpersonal relationships of great
vulnerability.
Unlike existing scholarship on theories of justice, however, I want
to inform this normative analysis with empirical information. Correc-
tive or retributive justice scholarship has been criticized as tending
toward excessively abstract moralism, consisting of reasoning that ei-
ther is impenetrable other than by philosophical analysis or that is
driven by assertion of priori moral premises.
21 In my view, the best
approach to justice should not be determined solely by philosophical
reflection; instead, law should also recognize how real patients actu-
ally respond psychologically to different approaches for compensating
injuries arising from medical relationships. I do not claim that justice
considerations should be analyzed primarily through empirical meth-
ods, but rather that empirical insights should at least be considered
where they address relevant aspects of the inquiry. For tort duties
arising from medicine, focusing on the trust dimension of medical re-
lationships helps to leaven abstract philosophical analysis with a
healthy dose of psychological empiricism.
Other scholars have also observed that concepts such as fairness,
justice, and retribution should be studied as psychological constructs
that are amenable to measurement through methods of social sci-
19. For instance, Jules Coleman, a leading corrective justice theorist, goes to great lengths to
create and define duties of compensation as arising out of the "relationship" that is created when
one person injures another. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 316-18. In medical malpractice, how-
ever, this relationship obviously exists prior to any injury and is well-defined in law and ethics.
Although Saks and colleagues report that corrective justice ranks at the bottom of relevant con-
siderations for malpractice reform, they still find that it is relevant, and notably that is it more
relevant to patients than to other interest groups. See generally Michael J. Saks et al., A Multiat-
tribute Utility Analysis of Legal System Responses to Medical Injuries, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 277
(2005).
20. See generally David E. Rogers, On Trust: A Basic Building Block for Healing Doctor!
Patient Interactions, THE PHAROS, Spring 1994, at 2. These conditions exist even in medical
relationships of very short duration, such as during surgery or childbirth, because trust results
from the deep vulnerability created by illness and medical treatment rather than the patient's
extensive knowledge of or experience with a physician.
21. Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1810 (1997) ("[Tlhe more recent literature on corrective justice
... has become highly abstruse and abstract in ways that render it all but inaccessible to readers
lacking a formal training in philosophy.").
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ence. 22 These efforts are the focus of the procedural justice branch of
law and society scholarship. 23 Procedural justice scholarship, as its
name indicates, is not focused on substantive law, however. My ap-
proach extends this social science perspective by studying the connec-
tions between substantive medical law and patients' trust in physicians
and medical institutions.
Those who have studied medical trust note its paradoxical nature.2 4
Patients can feel a deep sense of betrayal when treatment goes poorly,
but they also have a high capacity to forgive mistakes or to view bad
outcomes as unavoidable when they think that care providers are well
intentioned.25 Current malpractice law reflects both the betrayal and
the forgiveness attributes of trust-based medical relationships. 26 Mal-
practice law sets the standard of care according to prevailing medical
practices rather than letting juries decide what is reasonable to expect;
in part, this is meant to guard against the tendency of some juries to
be unduly punitive by expecting an unrealistic degree of perfection
from the medical system.27 However, courts have also liberalized mal-
practice law in a variety of ways, in part to overcome juries' reluctance
to find fault against well meaning physicians, even when negligence is
clear.28 An indication that law embodies both halves of this dualism
in large measure is that physicians see strong distrust emanating from
the medical malpractice system, 29 whereas many researchers and
22. See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW
33 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (stating "[gliven the
pervasiveness of retribution and revenge as justice motives, it is remarkable that so little empiri-
cal research has been devoted to these topics"). See also James Konow, Which Is the Fairest One
of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 1188 (2003) (surveying empirical
literature about various types of justice).
23. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 22; TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A
DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).
24. See generally Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It,
Can It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613 (2001).
25. Id. at 617.
26. Hall, supra note 1, at 492-96.
27. See generally Philip G. Peters, The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 911 (2002).
28. See generally id. (regarding the behavior of malpractice juries); see also NEIL VIDMAR,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995).
29. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIOIOUS SOCIETY 89-92 (1981) (using malpractice litiga-
tion to illustrate declining trust in the professions).
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scholars see excessive deference. 30 Reflecting the psychological para-
doxes of trust, both views are based in reality.
31
III. TRUST IMPLICATIONS OF MALPRACTICE REFORM PROPOSALS
How do various medical malpractice reform proposals take account
of the complex connections between law and medical trust? First, it is
unlikely that most alternative approaches to compensating medical in-
juries will assume any more of a proactive stance toward trust than
does conventional malpractice law. Almost all approaches to defining
medical duties and remedying breaches are likely to have no effect on
injured patients' trust in their particular care providers. This is not a
criticism of these proposals, but simply a statement of likely reality.
Therefore, to the extent one is concerned about issues of trust, the
relevant inquiry is how well these proposals take account of the nor-
mative aspects of trust-based relationships, and not whether these
proposals actually affect the level of trust as an empirical matter.
One possible exception to this generalization is the form of elective
no-fault, also known as "early offer" or "neo-no-fault," that encour-
ages care providers to disclose medical errors and to offer fair com-
pensation for the resulting injuries, regardless of technical definitions
of fault.32 Research reveals that, often, what injured patients most
desire are candid acknowledgements of medical errors, a sincere apol-
ogy that conveys genuine remorse, and constructive steps toward cor-
rective actions.33 Some versions of elective no-fault encourage these
30. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 13 (1991) (noting that "a large
gap obtains between the number of tort events taking place inside hospitals and those that even-
tually filter into the court system").
31. For a recent overview of both sides of this debate, see David Studdert et al., Medical
Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 (2004).
32. Jeffrey O'Connell is the original architect of this idea, but his approach still relies on pa-
tients to initiate a claim before providers are expected to come forward with an offer of compen-
sation. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell, Neo-No Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries:
Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 45 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1986); Jef-
frey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1982). Other approaches
seek to encourage providers to step forward earlier, before a claim is filed, or even before the
patient may realize he or she has oeen affected by a medical error. See INST. OF MED., FOSTER-
ING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 81-89
(Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002).
33. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1004, 1009 (1999):
Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients' and Physicians' Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medi-
cal Errors, 289 JAMA 1001 (2003); Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to
File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992); Kathleen
M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004). It is noteworthy that scholarship on the need for law generally to
facilitate apology often discusses medical malpractice cases as leading examples. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice,
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proactive steps by the responsible party rather than relying on pa-
tients' sense of wrongdoing to initiate a malpractice claim. 34 This ap-
proach has the potential to maintain or promote trust by pre-empting
a breach in the treatment relationship, or by encouraging a form of
reconciliation that might restore a broken relationship. 35 All other
reform proposals, however, continue to rely on patients to initiate
claims and to place providers in a defensive, non-apologetic position.
Therefore, they assume, perhaps correctly, that medical relationships
are irretrievably broken.
Even if reform proposals cannot hope to sustain or restore trust, it
is still important to consider the corrective justice perspective of how
well various reform proposals account for the trust-based characteris-
tics of treatment relationships. One prominent reform measure is to
cap non-compensatory damages at a level such as $250,000.36 This ap-
pears to blunt the retributive element of tort law and to undermine
the goal of corrective justice to restore patients fully to their pre-in-
jured position-even in the most severe cases where justice places the
greatest demands. Viewed normatively, then, a damages cap is diffi-
cult to defend.3
7
Viewed empirically, however, a damages cap may not in fact under-
mine the psychological foundations of corrective justice. Social sci-
ence studies of people's sense of fairness in a wide variety of legal
settings reveal that people respond as much or more to the procedural
as to the substantive dimensions of the legal system. 38 Litigants recog-
nize unfavorable outcomes as legitimate if they believe they have
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
34. See INST. OF MED., supra note 32, at 81-89.
35. See sources cited supra note 33. See generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO
PRACTICE (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000); Douglas N. Frenkel & Carol B. Lieb-
man, Words That Heal, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 482 (2004); Erin Ann O'Hara, Apology
and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Might Have in Common, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1055, 1079-81 (2004).
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS (July 2002), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf.
37. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, RESOLVING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS (Report of the Pew Charitable Trusts Project on Med. Liability in
Pa., June 2003), available at http://medliabilitypa.org/research/mehlman06O3/MehlmanReport.
pdf; Saks et al., supra note 19. Others, however, argue that caps are consistent with corrective
justice because nonpecuniary losses are speculative. See DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE
DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 119 (1996).
38. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of their Exper-
iences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 980-86 (1990); Tom R. Tyler & E.
Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK, supra note 22.
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been treated fairly during the proceedings. 39 Therefore, diminishing
the size of a favorable outcome might not significantly diminish pa-
tients' sense of vindication or retribution from winning a malpractice
verdict.
Might physicians' psychological sense of fairness and justice be any
more responsive than patients' to capping damages? This is not likely
for physicians who lose cases (and therefore for whom a damages cap
is relevant). Losing physicians still suffer the ignominy of being found
negligent and of having a sizeable verdict assessed against them.
40
Applying the procedural justice model of Professors Tom R. Tyler and
E. Allan Lind,41 physicians' extreme displeasure with the legal system
stems not from the size of verdicts but from the fact that, even when
they win,42 physicians are treated by the litigation process in a way
that undermines their sense of being trusted and respected profession-
als, which threatens their sense of standing in society.4 3 None of that
is changed by capping damages.
A second category of reforms consist of administrative no-fault
compensation systems. 44 These dispense with any attempt to assess
blame for medical injuries; therefore, they might be expected to mol-
lify physicians but at the same time to deny patients the vindication
they sometimes seek from the tort system. Moreover, they minimize
the "voice" that, according to procedural justice studies, litigants seek
from adversarial proceedings-namely the sense that their claim has
been heard and fairly considered. 45 On the other hand, studies show
39. Tyler & Lind. supra note 38, at 75; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of
Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 145-49
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
40. See William M. Sage, Principles, Pragmatism, and Medical Injury, 286 JAMA 226 (2001)
(describing the "moral opprobrium" that physicians attached to allegations of professional
malpractice).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 266-67 (6th ed. 2003)
(recounting a physician's outrage at being named in a lawsuit, even though he was soon dis-
missed); Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15-16 (2004) (recounting a physi-
cian's negative reaction to a jury trial that he won but his clinic employer lost).
43. For various accounts of physicians' attitudes toward being sued for malpractice, see How-
ARD C. SNYDER, JURY OF MY PEERS: A SURGEON'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE MALPRACTICE CRI-
SIS (1991); F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician's Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice,
23 GA. L. REV. 295 (1989); Nathaniel Hupert et al., Processing the Tort Deterrent Signal: A
Qualitative Study, 43 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Perform-
ance of a Selective No-Fault System, 265 JAMA 2836 (1991); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A.
Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (1998): David
Studdert, Toward a Workable Model of No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury in the United
States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001).
45. Lind et al., supra note 38, at 981; Tyler & Lind, supra note 38, at 75.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that procedural justice can be achieved through a wide variety of al-
ternative forms of dispute resolution.46
Regardless of who pays, or according to what standard, medical in-
jury claims unavoidably target a care provider and identify a medical
error. This may be sufficient to give patients the sense of justice they
seek. Certainly, physicians are likely to take umbrage at payment of
claims involving care they render even when fault is not assessed and
even when someone else pays. This is one reason physicians previ-
ously responded so coolly to proposals for exclusive enterprise liabil-
ity,47 which would hold only hospitals or health plans liable for
physicians' errors.
Ultimately, we cannot know for sure how an administrative no-fault
claims system would affect either party's sense of justice until the
question is studied empirically. Even when this is done, however, it is
likely the results will be inconclusive. Empirical studies of complex
psychological phenomena usually find that different and sometimes
contradictory positions are held simultaneously. This likely indeter-
minacy should not keep us from examining these questions empiri-
cally, however. Examining these questions helps to make more
explicit whether various positions are based on empirical assumptions
that lack any evidentiary support. Further, this helps to examine more
openly the inevitable trade-offs one faces between competing values
such as justice and efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
On balance, the reforms that call for early-offer no-fault compensa-
tion are the most consistent with trusting medical relationships. This
approach satisfies both the goals of corrective justice and the "restora-
tive justice" desire to maintain effective medical relationships. Other
reform approaches continue to address only law's reactive stance to-
ward trust, but do not attempt to promote trust. In the reactive
stance, some reforms might appear to detract materially from law's
ability to respond appropriately to serious violations of trust, but these
in part are empirical claims that have not been tested.
Beyond these limited insights into particular reform proposals, this
Article attempts to develop a more robust approach to analyzing med-
ical malpractice law from a perspective of corrective justice. This per-
spective has been neglected to date in favor of more instrumentally
46. Lind et al., supra note 38, at 959.
47. See generally Frances Miller & Anthony Harrison, Malpractice Liability and Physician Au-
tonomy, 342 LANCET 973 (1993).
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focused inquiries about deterrence and efficient compensation.
48 Fo-
cusing on the intensely trusting qualities of medical relationships
forces us to consider how law should account for the strong sense of
betrayal that can result from a breach of this trust. But, unlike correc-
tive justice theorists, I prefer to do this using the social science tools of
procedural justice studies. These allow us to test empirically, or at
least to hypothesize, whether different approaches to medical mal-
practice reform will give injured patients and accused physicians a
greater or lesser sense that justice is being done. Although this should
not be the sole, or perhaps even the primary, basis for deciding what is
best to do, this empirical psychological perspective should not be ne-
glected in considering how law responds to injuries arising from
deeply trusting medical relationships.
48. See generally David A. Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort: What Do We Know and
What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1639 (2002) (providing a compre-
hensive overview of medical malpractice literature).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:303
